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RSCPA and the criminology of social control 
 
 
Gordon Hughes and Claire Lawson 
 
Abstract This paper contributes to a rethinking of animal abuse control and animal welfare 
protection in criminology, specifically, and in the social sciences more broadly. We do this, first, 
through a broad mapping of the institutional control complex around animal abuse in contemporary 
Britain. Second, we focus on the institutional strategies and practices, past and present, of the main 
agency of animal protection, and the policing thereof, in this society, namely the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). In looking back to this charity‟s growth since the first 
decades of the nineteenth century at the time of the birth of modern industrial capitalism and also to its 
current rationale and practices as a late-modern, corporate organisation, we explore the seeming 
paradox of a private body taking a lead on the regulation and prosecution of illegalities associated with 
animal-human relationships. Finally, the ideology and strategy of the RSPCA are explored in the 
context of the often visceral and culturally influential „morality war‟ associated with proponents, 
respectively, of animal rights („abolition‟) and „anthropic‟ welfare proponents („regulation‟ and 
„protection‟). 
 
Key words: animal abuse; policing; Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA); 
welfarism; multi-agency governance 
 
Introduction 
In the emerging subfield of the criminology of animal abuse, much attention has been on the aetiology 
of the perpetrator and the nature of the dyad between (human) criminal/s and (non-human) victim/s. 
Much less attention has been paid to the dynamics of control associated with the various agencies, both 
state-based and voluntary or third sector. In this paper we begin by mapping the major institutional 
circuits of control, linked variously to detection and enforcement, welfare provision and rights based 
practices in the multi-agency governance of animal abuse. In order to explore in depth these control 
processes we then focus on the longest established, yet curiously so often ignored, institutional player 
in the policing of animal abuse and the protection of animal welfare in Britain over the past two 
hundred years, namely, the RSPCA. To date there has been no sustained criminological analysis of this 
key institutional player
1. The case of the RSPCA is notable given that „on the ground‟ it is arguably 
both an unusual historical and contemporary instance of a non-state agency having more importance in 
law enforcement and regulation than the public police in addressing crimes and related harms with 
regard to the human ill-treatment of animals in a modern centralised state. Accordingly for nearly two 
hundred years it has been a powerful, non-state player in one area of the field of crime control and 
harm reduction in which the state has played a limited „hands-off‟ role, other than in the creation of 
                                                 
1Historians have not been so guilty of this neglect, as we shall see below. The silence of most criminologists may 
reflect both the state-based, criminal justice system focus of modern criminology and also he more widely 
acknowledged marginality of animal abuse to the sociological study of crime and its control. 
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laws pertaining to animal abuse and dangerous animals. The RSPCA is also an institution which today 
is surrounded by controversy in the eyes of animal rights lobbyists due to its welfarist philosophy and 
its reformist, and in some eyes „conservative‟, policies on farming and food production and scientific 
experimentation on animals alongside its role in controlling dangerous and neglected animals and 
killing unwanted and badly abused animals. The RSPCA is thus an institutional player actively 
involved in the contested politics and „morality war‟ with regard to the „appropriate‟ relationship of the  
human/non-human animal world. It is ideologically representative of the humanitarian, welfarist animal 
protection movement (as against the „karmic‟ animal rights movement). Again such highly contested 
and unfinished political and normative issues are of central importance to the contemporary debates in 
criminology regarding environmentalism and the broader study of harms, both human and non-human 
in nature. 
 It has been noted by several key contributors to this Special Issue that animal abuse remains 
both a marginal and marginalised area for criminological investigation. The absence of sustained 
research and analysis on the causes of animal abuse in its myriad forms has rightly of late gained 
greater attention not least through the efforts over two decades of Piers Beirne, in particular, across the 
fluid disciplinary borders of sociology and criminology. Writing in the mid-1990s Beirne [1] 
highlighted the dearth of dedicated texts and research and in the fifteen years since this article there has 
been but limited growth of criminological research and expert commentary, largely confined to so-
called environmental or green criminology [3, 44] but, not, surprisingly, „zemiology‟2. 
 A useful working definition of animal abuse is offered by Beirne and Messerschmidt ([5] 
p.152) as: 
any act that contributes to the pain, suffering or death of an animal or that otherwise threatens 
its welfare. Animal abuse may be physical, psychological, or emotional, may involve active 
maltreatment or passive neglect or omission, and may be direct, or indirect, intentional or 
unintentional. Some forms of animal abuse are socially acceptable. 
 
 Given that the key problematic in contemporary sociological criminology is that crimes are 
interactional phenomena necessarily conceived as emergent properties and products of the wider 
human figurations in which they are embedded, it is in turn vital that theory of and research into the 
crimes (and non-criminalised harms) of animal abuse must in part centre questions of „reaction‟ or 
control (alongside action and causation). Once again the silence of criminologists on the policing of 
animal abuse is striking with a few exceptions (see [4, 35]) This paper aims to unsettle this situation 
and contribute to the promotion of a sustained research programme on animal abuse control and animal 
welfare protection. 
                                                 
2The study of social harms, recently badged as „zemiology‟, would appear an appropriate home for the growing 
research surrounding harms done to animals, including those in sport, entertainment and farming for they are legal 
activities that animal welfare and animal rights lobbies have thus far been unable to inveigle governments to 
criminalise. Whilst it may seem obvious to situate animal abuse within zemiology there is little evidence to 
demonstrate zemiologists have open arms. For example, Hillyard et al. ([24] p.48) catalogue a vast array of social 
harms at corporate, state and international levels yet animal abuse is overlooked. 
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The policing of animal abuse: mapping a criminological terra incognita 
 
We offer in this section of the paper an initial mapping of the major institutional players in the circuits 
of control, linked variously to detection and enforcement, welfare provision, and rights based practices 
in the multi-agency governance of animal abuse as evident in the contemporary UK. What are the key 
features to the contemporary „control complex‟ [18] regarding detection, prosecution and prevention of 
crimes and harms associated with human-animal relations? 
 Pierpoint and Maher ([35] pp.481-5) offer a valuable overview of both the legislative context 
regarding animal cruelty including the numerous pieces of legislation that have been enacted since the 
first successful anti-cruelty bill in Britain in 1822 which gave cattle, horses and sheep some limited 
protection. In particular such laws have created offences of cruelty to animals, and regulations and 
sanctions to protect wildlife and the welfare of livestock.  The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) of 2006 is 
the most comprehensive piece of primary legislation to date and it now covers most of the issues 
contained in previous major pieces of legislation. In passing the RSPCA has been the major non-state 
based „expert‟ lobbyist in this history of law-making as well as policy implementation. 
 Despite the plethora of legislation since the nineteenth century, there remains little systematic 
statistical evidence regarding trends and patterns in recorded animal abuse. As Pierpoint and Maher 
([35] pp.485-6) note, the little that is known about the prevalence of reported animal abuse is derived 
from court records and animal welfare charities. Throughout this period it would appear that the 
RSPCA has consistently brought the majority of prosecutions to the courts. However, there is a major 
evidential hole awaiting any attempt to assess systematically the trends in prevalence of animal abuse 
both over time and cross-sectionally at any given time in Britain. Most significantly, it was accepted by 
the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the post-legislative assessment of 
AWA in December 2010 that there was no national enforcement database regarding the enforcement of 
the Act despite the original intention of this being part of a regulatory impact assessment [11]. 
Furthermore, animal cruelty offences recorded by the police are not collected by the Home Office - we 
therefore have little other than anecdotal testimony in the absence of sustained criminological research 
to rely on in dealing with the seeming growth in the problem, for example, of abuse of dogs and their 
involvement in crime and anti-social behaviour (see Hughes et al. [26]). 
 Even given the above caveats regarding the nature of the problem of animal abuse and lack of 
systematic and coordinated recorded information regarding public efforts to control and regulate it in 
its myriad forms, it is clear that there are multiple types of responses. In particular, private, interest-
group involvement is well established in this field, again epitomised by the work of the Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) since 1824
3
 but also including smaller charities and pressure 
groups. This is a field of control characterised by the actions of plural agencies though less often 
coordinated multi-agency partnership working, the latter being processes increasingly characteristic of 
crime prevention and community safety practices across many contemporary late modern societies 
[25]. 
                                                 
3  The prefix „Royal‟ was added later as a result of formal royal patronage from Queen Victoria in 1840. 
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RSPCA and plural policing 
The field of animal abuse control is characterised by plural policing. In this regime both private and 
state-based public bodies share the field from initial inquiry to prosecution and back again to 
prevention. Whilst much current criminological analysis points to the recent, potentially seismic shifts 
towards governance „beyond‟ the state [14], little if any attention as yet has been given to the long-term 
continuity in plural policing and indeed private prosecutions in the control of animal abuse in the UK. 
In Private Security and Public Policing, Jones and Newburn ([27] p.18) examined the terminology of 
policing and declared that it includes „organised forms of order maintenance, peace-keeping, rule or 
law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and associated 
information-brokering‟. Whilst plotting the growth in both private and plural policing, the influential 
work of Jones and Newburn [27, 28] failed to refer to the role of the voluntary sector and in particular 
to the RSPCA as a private, charitable policing service. In turn Crawford et al. [10] more recently 
researched the trend in plural policing in terms of „visible patrols‟. However, they omit any mention of 
a public-facing body such as the RSPCA and its nationwide uniformed body of inspectors in what is 
otherwise a comprehensive review of visible policing and its „extended family‟. Button ([7] p.133) has 
also provided an extensive discussion of the key trends in private policing but whilst noting that „given 
the growing concern with the environment and with animal welfare issues, it is surprising the RSPCA 
has received little attention‟, he does little to address this. More perturbing perhaps is that Button‟s 
justification for studying the RSPCA is lodged in terms of the current growing public and 
criminological interest and not in the two centuries of legislation and law enforcement already in 
existence around animal welfare. 
 The silence to date of policing researchers regarding the practices of the RSPCA as a 
charitable organisation taking the lead on much of our society‟s „fight‟ against cruelty to and neglect of 
animals stretching unbroken from the nineteenth to twenty-first centuries is indicative of the 
marginality of crimes and violence against animals to the criminological enterprise writ large. Later in 
the paper we consider the important critiques lodged at the feet of animal welfare organisations such as 
the RSPCA and the Humane Society of the United States („HSUS‟) which have emerged from an 
admixture of radical moral philosophy and the animal rights movement since the latter decades of the 
twentieth century. These critiques have informed the emerging „green‟ criminological thinking on 
animal abuse and the associated critique of „speciesism‟ of which this Special Issue is itself largely a 
product. As we shall see shortly, important connections may be made between anti-speciesist critiques 
with regard to the „reformist‟ and „conservative‟ strategies of large-scale corporate animal protection 
organisations such as the RSPCA and the grand neo-marxist, structuralist criminological narratives of 
state and corporate control and punitiveness more broadly. These compelling structuralist-theoretical 
narratives of control also come at a conceptual price in possibly closing off healthy agonistic dispute 
over the difficult moral and political questions associated with the competing claims regarding the 




RSPCA, animals and the state in modern Britain 
 
We have been at pains to note the neglect of both animal abuse and those institutions tasked with 
regulating such human/animal figurations in the criminological canon. Of course Beirne [1] is right to 
note that there has been an often hidden presence of the animal in criminology‟s meditations on the 
crime question over the course of its chequered disciplinary history. What concerns us here is 
somewhat more limited in scope: namely developing both a conceptual and empirical framework for 
locating the key control institution of the RSPCA within contemporary criminological thinking on 
social control more broadly. 
         We have noted that social scientists and in particular criminologists have neglected both issues of 
animal abuse and the policing of this problem. This stands in sharp relief to the work of moral 
philosophers, both ancient and modern [2, 19]. It also compares unfavourably with the work of social 
historians of the emergent industrial capitalist and urbanising society of the nineteenth century [34, 43]. 
Foremost among these scholars in contextualising the place of the RSPCA in terms of being a mirror 
reflecting and refracting key ideological, cultural and political currents and fissures in that society is 
the research undertaken by Harrison some forty years ago [22]. As with all good historiography, 
Harrison‟s 1973 essay Animals and the State in nineteenth century England provides both a window on 
the particularities of past human collective practices and insights for understanding our history of the 
present. 
      In this section of the paper we begin with the lessons offered by social historical research for social 
scientists today interested in the control and regulation of animal abuse before we turn our attention to 
contemporary developments, and both continuities and discontinuities with the past, associated with the 
work of the RSPCA at the beginning of twenty-first century. 
 
Origins of the RSPCA: contemporary criminological lessons from the past? 
Harrison ([22] p.786) begins by contrasting the commonsensical claim from judge Lord Devlin in 1968 
that „there is hardly anyone nowadays who would not be disgusted by the thought of deliberate cruelty 
to animals‟ with the realities of living in a predominantly rural society in 1800 where the dependence 
on the slaughter of animals was a harsh and mundane fact of life. He contrasts this with the transition 
wrought by the 1870s where the claims of animals for both kinder treatment and much greater 
regulation had become institutionalised - albeit in the face of often fierce resistance - and as statistically 
represented by the registration of one million licensed dogs and over 800,000 licensed horses by this 
latter decade. 
 Much of this cultural transformation was in large measure made possible by the work of the 
SPCA and subsequently RSPCA. It is also evident to a social historian like Harrison that the story of 
the RSPCA has powerful resonances with socio-political issues in his own contemporary context of the 
late twentieth century. Noting the pertinence of the RSPCA story to political scientists‟ contemporary 
studies of „humanitarian‟ pressure groups, Harrison provides a powerful, empirically-based argument 
that it was one of the most continuously influential bodies on nineteenth century opinion but also 
almost uniquely one of the better known reform groups which consistently „collaborated with the 
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authorities‟ ([22] p.787). The RSPCA was thus often caught between the opinions of its own members 
and those of the government department with which it had to work. Robert Garner [12] has more 
recently reaffirmed this strategy of the RSPCA continuing into the twenty-first century as we shall see 
below. The other key feature of the RSPCA‟s „mission‟ in the nineteenth century was the desire for 
„moral and religious progress‟, particularly with regard to „the pleasures and livelihood of the very 
poor‟ ([22] p.789), both regarding the cruelty to „beasts of burden‟ and to animals used in sport and for 
pleasure. The origins of the RSPCA were certainly of a Christian missionary and civilising zeal - 
according to its critics, past and present, it was a morally prudish movement and organisation of upper- 




 Harrison organises his inquiry into four questions, namely, (i) what is the chronology of 
legislation, (ii) how was the latter enforced, (iii) what techniques were used in winning support for 
animal protection, and (iv) how was it defended in argument ([22] p.787). These questions provide a 
valuable template for the sociological analysis of the RSPCA in our contemporary conjuncture. 
 
Let‟s begin with the first area of concern: the legislative landmarks in the nineteenth century. 
Animals are considered as property only: to destroy or to abuse them, from malice to the 
proprietor, or with an intention injurious to his interest in them, is criminal; but the animals 
themselves are without protection; the law regards them not substantively; they have no rights! 
(Lord Thomas Erskine, 15th May 1809) 
 
 The above quote is from Erskine‟s introduction to his Cruelty to Animals Bill in the House of 
Lords debate - which signified a shift in attitude among some influential sections of „polite‟ society‟ 
regarding the status of animals. Although this Bill and a later version failed, it laid the foundations for 
legislation that would protect animals for the first time in the UK. Indeed, „by encouraging kindness to 
animals, the Society hoped eventually to civilise manners, and hence to make the masses more 
receptive to religious instruction‟ [21]. 
 Lord Erskine failed on two occasions to pass his Act to Prevent Malicious and Wanton Cruelty 
to Animals in 1809 and 1810 and such efforts were greeted with widespread ridicule. The cudgels were 
then taken up by Richard Martin MP supported by a group of „evangelical humanitarians‟ who in 1822 
were finally successful in securing the first major animal protection legislation in the UK with the Act 
to Prevent the Cruel and Improper Treatment of Cattle. This was to establish the principle of protecting 
animals against cruelty by law and through pressure from the privileged supporters of the (R)SPCA 
further types of cruelty were, once again, to be banned including a range of animal fighting and baiting. 
 Following the 1822 Act Martin, nicknamed „Humanity Dick‟ by King George IV, was soon in 
need of „policing machinery‟ to enforce the new law ([4] p.11). As Radford ([36] p.40) observes, for 
legislation „to be effective, it must be enforced‟ but at this historical juncture of laissez faire capitalism 
                                                 
4 This accusation of an obsession with the dangerous habits of the lower orders or in contemporary argot, the 
„underclass‟, has been reaffirmed with regard to the RSPCA‟s role in the policing and control of „dangerous‟ dogs 
by libertarian journalists (O‟Neil, [31]) and libertarian criminologists (Hallsworth, this issue, Kaspersson, [29]) 
alike. 
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the State undertook but a minimal „nightwatchman state‟ role. Into this void the RSPCA developed its 
own „constabulary‟, later renamed as the „inspectorate‟. Radford ([36] p.40) recounts that at the time of 
the creation of the RSPCA there was significant scepticism regarding, and often overt rejection of, the 
state‟s role in prosecutions and enforcement of the criminal law, thus the majority of such legal actions 
were brought by private individuals. This is perhaps why the Metropolitan Police, the first modern 
professional police force in Britain, was not created until after the SPCA in 1829. Curiously the 
Metropolitan Police were invited in 1852 to take over managing the RSPCA‟s constables, but a 
satisfactory agreement was never reached ([22] p.811). 
 „Policing‟ was a term in regular use long before the advent of the modern police force. Indeed 
in the eighteenth century, before the concept of a professional police force, there were alternatives 
operating in law enforcement, namely the Associations for the Prosecution of Felons which attempted 
to address the quandary that the prosecution was dependent on the victim discovering, detaining, and 
funding the prosecution, of the perpetrator ([42] p.136). This was the system into which the (R)SPCA 
was born and its relevance is vital to understanding the Society‟s role today. Garland ([18] p.32) has 
influentially analysed the decline of the private police and prosecution bodies in the nineteenth century 
but failed to recognise that at least one such body continued and thrived. While, as he describes (ibid), 
„citizens increasingly orientated their complaints to the state‟, in terms of animal cruelty and the 
RSPCA there is no evidence that this was the case. 
 The traditional „Whiggish‟ narrative of the onward march of progress and enlightenment tells 
the story in the following picaresque Dickensian terms. Several leading, religiously motivated figures 
such as Rev. Arthur Broome and William Wilberforce gathered at the Old Slaughter‟s Coffee House in 
London on June 16th 1824 and formed the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. At its 
inauguration the members of the new SPCA described its purpose as to ensure „the mitigation of 
animal suffering, and the promotion and expansion of the practice of humanity towards the inferior 
classes of animated beings‟ ([36] p.41). This is of course the language of Christian missionary 
evangelism directed not least also at the „inferior‟ human classes. Despite the archaic sounding 
wording, this humanitarian and anthropocentric welfarist disposition remains that of the RSPCA to this 
day. In the framework provided by the sociology of deviancy we can interpret the nineteenth century 
history of the RSPCA as being that of a moral and political crusade manufactured by the lobbying of an 
increasingly influential network of „moral entrepreneurs‟, successfully mobilising influential opinion 
by the chronicling of a „moral panic‟ with its „folk devils‟ (uncivilised, un-Christian savages) which 
needed to be subjected to reformation through new governmental modes of discipline and punishment. 
 We have noted that the RSPCA did not content itself with legislating as an elite pressure 
group. Rather, it is peculiar in creating agencies which enforced the new legal rules: „a sort of private 
police force with a strictly limited area of concern‟ ([22] p.793). Between 1830 and 1900 Harrison 
[ibid] has estimated that its prosecutions doubled in every decade with the 1890s witnessing over 
71,000 prosecutions. This successful expansion of the reach of the de facto major institutional 
expression of formal animal abuse control and repression was linked to the co-operation between the 
paid constables and unpaid subscribers to the Society. Harrison acknowledges that we have little 
written evidence of what the „policework‟ of RSPCA inspectors in this period really looked like. There 
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is no rich evidence of the „crucially important moments when the Society made contact with the culture 
it despised. Reflective accounts of these incidents would greatly clarify the relationship between 
nineteenth-century humanitarianism and social class‟ ([22] p.795). Whilst the RSPCA today certainly 
highlights the work of its constituent employees and volunteers in its publicity documents and public 
accounts (see, for example, RSPCA [38]), we still lack a rich body of ethnographic evidence on latter-
day RSPCA policing work on the ground. We lack then this particular ethnography of animal abuse 
control as „socially situated action‟ [15] which could contribute to a wider research-based criminology 
of social control. 
 Harrison‟s third and fourth lines of inquiry focused on what we term the RSPCA‟s 
„mobilisation strategy‟ and „ideological defence‟ which he described as both „prudent‟ and 
„professional‟ and opposed to what a contemporary member described as „any fanatical excesses‟.  This 
was very evident in the RSPCA‟s strategy towards vivisection.  Whereas anti-vivisectionists in the later 
decades of the nineteenth century moved towards abolitionism, the RSPCA “adopted the alternative 
and characteristic strategy of pressing for stricter regulation” ([22] p.805 emphasis added). Harrison 
alludes to the institution from its earliest origins to its late twentieth-century incarnation always being 
identified with the „Establishment‟. According to Harrison ([22] p.808) this conservative‟ strategy was 
to prove successful and may have important lessons for the current debates raging over animal rights 
and animal protection. 
 Harrison‟s conclusion and guarded celebration of the work of evangelical „do-gooders‟ sits 
uneasily with the scepticism of much critical criminology over reforms in justice and punishment in 
modernity. Such scepticism, which reaches its apogee in the anti-humanist, anti-modernist and 
dystopian analysis of Michel Foucault [16] on the technologies of penality, is of course an important 
corrective to the Whiggish historiographies plotting the inevitable and onward march of progress and 
enlightenment from the great „Victorian‟ reformers. However, the cost of such grand, dystopian and 
deterministic narratives from Foucault and his acolytes is the downplaying of the „real stuff of 
disposition, choice and action – the stuff of which society and history are actually made‟ ([18] p.25). 
We need to be as wary of assuming the inferred repressive dystopian intentions and consequences of 
elitist reform movements and control agencies such as the RSPCA as we are regarding the supposed 
„pathologies‟ of the poor „deviant‟ sections of society most often subject to regulation and control from 
above. 
 Harrison‟s historical monograph represents the most sustained academic research on the 
RSPCA as a social institution. But the issues Harrison raises are also worthy of detailed attention given 
their contemporary resonance for understanding the axial role played by the RSPCA as a key agency of 
animal abuse control in our present times. Let us now map some of the key features of the RSPCA as a 
late-modern control institution. 
 
What’s late-modern about the RSPCA? 
Looking across the globe, the RSPCA stands out as one of the giants of the animal protection and 
welfare „enterprise‟ [12]. The RSPCA is a large-scale corporate body and represents one of the largest 
charities in the UK today. Of its total annual income over £70 million derives from legacy income built 
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up over the last two centuries from bequests and £35-40 million from donors. Organisationally, the 
institution also remains reliant on voluntary support, not just from sizeable donations as a charity but 
also as a result of its 170 branches run by local volunteers (who were termed „subscribers‟ in the 
nineteenth century). Its expenditure is also large-scale, amounting to over £100 million per annum, of 
which £32 million is spent on the inspectorate, £23 million on its establishments, £21 million on the 
cost of generating funds, and £11 million on prosecutions [39]. 
 The RSPCA is also one of the UK‟s most recognised „brand names‟ (no doubt helped - as well 
as stigmatised by opponents - by the monarchical moniker „Royal‟). It was ranked recently as the 
fourth most prominent charity in the UK in the Charity Brand Index ([13] p.4). Such a status would 
appear to indicate significant sections of the public‟s affection for the organisation given that factors 
such as reputation and income generated are incorporated in this Index. Such a celebrated identity 
could perhaps have deterred critical inquiry if there appeared little merit in pursuing a seemingly 
virtuous organisation or in commonsensical, ideological terms a „national treasure‟. 
 However, it is perhaps more likely that researchers have misinterpreted either the law 
enforcement work of the RSPCA or the legal status and mandate it has to enforce such laws. 
Paradoxically such a myth that the organisation is a government arm conflicts with the very prominent 
charity status recorded in the Index above. Further still, if the RSPCA‟s status has indeed been 
construed as quasi-governmental, then the question of why this function has not been the subject of any 
significant academic scrutiny remains striking
5
. 
 As noted above, Harrison divides his monograph on the nineteenth century development of the 
animal protection movement and in particular the axial role of the RSPCA in these processes into four 
themes covering (1) legislative and legal developments, (2) enforcement of the law(s), (3) mobilisation 
strategy, and (4) ideological defence. This heuristic categorisation is helpful to our understanding of the 
institution at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
 First the RSPCA continues to influence legal developments. This is most recently evident in 
its lobbying and expert advice on the most comprehensive, enabling legislation at the time of writing, 
the Aninal Welfare Act (AWA) of 2006. It has been claimed by leading RSPCA representatives that the 
most notable shift in the RSPCA‟s explicit role in crime prevention emerged when it succeeded in 
persuading the Government to pass the new AWA given that this legislation contains the ability to 
proactively prevent the suffering of animals for the first time [37]. As a result of this legislation, a duty 
of care is placed on the owner or keeper of the animal and the needs of the animal must be provided 
for. There is no need to prove that the animal has suffered - only that it is likely suffer should the 
situation not improve. Inspectors appointed under the Act within local authorities can now serve 
statutory improvement notices. The combination of the threat of prosecution and the softer provision of 
assistance and financial support appear to have enabled individuals to comply with the notices, but 
more importantly the animals have not gone on to suffer ([37] p.6). 
 I n turn, the RSPCA continues to offer both expert advice and guarded criticism on current 
deficiencies in the legislative arsenal of the state, such as the Dangerous Dogs Act of 1991 (amended 
1997) and proposals for amendment of this piece of legislation which is widely regarded as being 
                                                 
5 Note, however, the brief but undeveloped analysis in Grabosky [20] and Scott, [41]. 
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populist, ill-thought through and largely symbolic. The list of interventions in laws could go on and 
would now include the RSPCA‟s international lobbying for legislative changes at the EU level and 
most recently with the lengthy negotiations with the Chinese state in formulating its first formal 
enactment of anti-animal cruelty regulations.  It is no exaggeration then to view the RSPCA as a global 
player in animal project debates beyond the UK [32]. 
 In terms of enforcement of the law, the RSPCA remains de facto the major investigative, 
protection and prosecution agency on animal abuse and neglect cases
6
. Annually the organisation‟s 
national control centre receives about 1.3 million calls from the public. In turn 135,000 animals were 
collected and rescued by the institution [39]. The latest data compiled by the agency for 2009 reveals a 
count of 141,000 cruelty complaints investigated which resulted in 2,500 known convictions of 1,500 
persons. The contemporary RSPCA annual reports present graphic in-depth cases of successfully 
prosecuted offences in its review of its activities, highlighting for public consumption in no uncertain 
terms the depths of cruelty perpetrated by its human offenders. In turn it is able to boast of a high 
success rate (98%) for cases brought to court. The types of offences prosecuted or dealt with less 
adversarially range in descending order from cruelty (mostly to dogs), welfare offences, adult written 
cautions, breach of disqualification, offences against wildlife, juvenile-related offences, and animal 
fighting [40]. In their discussion of the national databases, Pierpoint and Maher [35] conclude that the 
RSPCA prosecutes the majority of cases in comparison to the other two major prosecuting agencies, 
namely the Crown Prosecution Service, and local authorities. However, they acknowledge the 
quantitative and qualitative data to substantiate this is lacking. 
 With regard to front-line „policing‟ staff, the RSPCA employs 300 uniformed inspectors 
(including inspectors in the special operations unit often working with the police on the most serious 
cases of abuse and cruelty). Alongside this most visible outward facing „enforcement‟ group, the 
agency has a large body of staff including veterinary and animal care specialists in its hospitals, clinics 
and branches, which in recent years have treated in excess of 200,000 animals annually. According to 
its own latest official figures, the RSPCA‟s animal centers routinely microchip 73,000 and neuter 
87,000 domestic animals per annum. The RSPCA also has four science departments and much of its 
self-promotion in terms of improving „the lot‟ of livestock animals of the agri-business complex is 
associated with the monitoring and registration of its „Freedom Food‟ label of humane treatment which 
currently covers 900 million animals in the UK each year [39]. As we shall see below this is an area of 
work for which the RSPCA has been widely criticised of late. 
 What, then, are the legal powers of the RSPCA as a prosecuting agency? A degree of 
misunderstanding or misinformation on this subject has always been prevalent and arguably utilised by 
the RSPCA itself [30]. Scott ([41] pp.62-63) is certainly mistaken in classifying the RSPCA as an 
                                                 
6 Despite the inclusion of the term „prevention‟ in its title, it is the enforcement of the law with which the RSPCA 
is most associated, both internally (Lawson, [30]) and in the broader public perception of its mission. In terms of 
notions of crime and harm prevention involving an emphasis of proactive actions before crimes or harms ensue, 
the preventive role of the RSPCA remains underdeveloped (see Hughes et al. [26]) despite the provisions in the 
AWA noted above. As noted previously, much of the day-to-day work of the RSPCA is filling in an enforcement 
and prosecutorial „void‟ and providing a governmental function which the state has not addressed directly. In the 
words of a leading RSPCA spokesperson at its Status Dogs Summit in 2010, commenting on the policy transfer 
implications of the „British model‟ for policing and law enforcement of animal abuse, „An NGO taking the slack is 
not the best model to start with‟. 
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example of „delegated regulatory power‟ and as an institution that possesses a „statutory power to 
prosecute‟. In fact the RSPCA is a registered charity, with its law enforcement role operating solely 
under the legal jurisdiction of England and Wales. This charitable status is an important designation to 
comprehend for it requires that the purpose of the organisation to be ultimately for public benefit. For 
the RSPCA, and other animal welfare charities, prevailing legal judgments have established that public 
benefit to be defined as the „promotion of human morality‟; thus animals are only to benefit indirectly 
([6] p.58]. 
 It is not technically a formal prosecuting body because, „in pursuing alleged offenders, it is 
acting entirely as a private prosecutor‟ ([36] p.380), and thus is not obliged but may have regard for the 
Crown Prosecution Service Code [8]. It is the category of the legislation being utilised which 
determines the RSPCA‟s ability to prosecute. The legal theorist Radford ([36] p.380) notes that, 
without any formal declaration, both the criminal justice authorities and the RSPCA consider their 
Inspectors as investigating officers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. The rules under this 
legislation bind officers with regard to actions during custody and interrogation. However, RSPCA 
Inspectors possess no power or authority beyond that of an ordinary citizen, so cannot enter a premises 
without permission nor arrest or remove evidence; thus police assistance in these matters is paramount 
([23] p.220). 
 The government‟s own position regarding the RSPCA‟s legal status as a prosecuting body has 
been obscure and until very recently had to be unearthed painstakingly from often obscure guidelines 
and documents. For example, under „Relations with Other Agencies‟ in the Domestic and Captive 
Animals section of the CPS‟s website [9], the only note says: 
  
      The Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) has a long established 
expertise in both the investigation and prosecution of cases involving animal welfare and has 
built up a useful body of precedent and case law. 
 
In December 2010, the RSPCA was acknowledged in the post-legislative assessment of the AWA by 
DEFRA as „the principal agency responsible for the day-to-day enforcement of the Act‟ ([11] p.13). 
This remains a rare instance where such formal public recognition has ever been found, which could 
suggest a reluctance on behalf of the state authorities to fully disclose the reality, or perhaps the 
ignominy, of the situation [30]. 
 Moving on to questions of mobilisation strategy and ideological defence, the historian 
Harrison ([22] p.805) recounts how from its earliest foundations the RSPCA „found itself in a political 
situation, where opposition to the powerful on one issue had to be moderated in the hope of attracting 
support from the powerful on another‟. To repeat our earlier point, this centrist strategy has consistently 
been its doctrine into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For supporters of this strategy „radical 
activities have been eschewed in favour of patiently but persistently accumulating a formidable body of 
protective legislation‟ ([22] p.808). 
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To this day, explicit engagement in what we may call the „morality war‟ around the seemingly 
irreconcilable positions of animal exploitation abolitionists and those of reformist animal protection 
positions (of which the RSPCA is a powerful and brooding „Establishment‟ representative) is 
impossible to find in any official RSPCA documents and statements. At best we find briefing notes for 
teachers on „humans and other animals‟, „creating an animal welfare charter‟, „ethics, animal 
experiments and the law‟ and such like in its education publications which steadfastly avoid the type of 
deeply engaged moral and political debate characteristic of animal rights lobbying organisations. The 
ideology of the RSPCA on the vexed issue of animal rights versus animal welfare remains tellingly 
under- if not un-stated in any explicit manner of the kind we find in the work of an animal 
protectionism advocate such as Garner [12]. As an Establishment institution „above‟ politics, it would 
appear that the RSPCA pragmatically avoids public debate on the politics and ethics of animal rights 
versus animal welfare. 
 Despite this public silence, the RSPCA is an institution which is surrounded today by 
controversy in the eyes of animal rights lobbyists and „scholar-activists‟ ([45] p.1209) and a growing 
number of proponents of a „non-speciesist‟ criminology. Much of this controversy is linked to its 
„humanitarian welfarist‟ philosophy and its reformist, and in the eyes of some [12], „conservative‟ 
policies and practices particularly with regard to „humane‟ farming and animal food production and 
scientific experimentation on animals
7
. Meanwhile in the eyes of anti-state, libertarian critical 
criminologists, criticism is also lodged at the RSPCA‟s feet for its axial, governmental role in 
controlling dangerous and neglected animals and killing unwanted, badly abused animals, particularly 
„dangerous‟ dogs (Hallsworth, this Issue, Kaspersson, [29]). The RSPCA is thus an institutional player 
which is, willingly or not, actively implicated in a contested politics and „morality war‟ with regard to 
the „appropriate‟ relationship between humans and non-human animals. 
 What in brief are the features of the „animal welfare‟ view for which the RSPCA is both 
globally renowned and increasingly vilified?
8
 The animal welfare view is widely regarded as being one 
in which animals are viewed as being at least „partial members‟ of the moral community‟ due to their 
sentience whilst accepting that humans may use animals for human purposes. This welfarist position 
also claims that it is morally wrong to inflict unnecessary harm or suffering on animals or to treat them 
in ways that are not „humane‟. According to supporters of this avowedly anthropocentric world-view, 
even the property status of animals is not an inevitable obstacle to them receiving better treatment, as 
evidenced in the comparative treatment of animals across different cultures today ([12] pp.124-46). 
 
                                                 
7 Animal rights critics of the RSPCA say little, it would seem, about its routine repression of animal cruelty and 
regular prosecution of human perpetrators which, as is clear from our previous analysis makes up a very 
significant area of its work and institutional logic. 
 
8 Of course, we do not come to this debate „value-free‟ and „politics-free‟. Our broad normative position is that of 
humanitarian and anthropocentric welfarism. We remain wary of the more „karmic‟ direction in debates on 
human/non human animal interface whereby the human is re-absorbed into natural history ([17] p.5). We broadly 
concur with the modernist founders of sociology on the uniqueness of the human animal as residing in their 
„participation in large-scale corporate projects that defy the gene‟s eye-view of the world‟ ([17] p.6), not least at 
times in reversing or neutralising the effects of „natural selection‟. This is indeed a feature of both animal 
protection and animal rights political projects. 
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 What in brief are the counter-claims of abolitionist proponents? Let‟s focus on a number of 
key claims made in Francione‟s abolitionist critique of the RSPCA and other globally influential 
animal welfare institutions. According to Francione ([12] p.51), „Making society feel more comfortable 
about animal exploitation is more often than not an explicit goal of animal welfare campaigns and 
organisations‟. Specifically cited evidence in support of this claim is the labelling schemes for 
humanely farmed animal food produce and in particular the RSPCA‟s Freedom Food label ([12] pp.52-
3). In turn, it is suggested that such schemes do not translate into significant welfare benefits for non-
human animals kept under such „humane‟ conditions, backed up „empirically‟ by the citing of 
notorious examples of badly regulated enterprises. Furthermore, and most crucially, it is contended that 
the overall consequence of animal welfarism has been to reinforce the „property paradigm‟ regarding 
non-human animals and is often based on „increasing the efficiency of exploitation‟ ([12] p.45). 
Radical, if not revolutionary, animal rights „scholar-activists‟ like Francione conclude by condemning 
reformist „traditionally conservative groups‟ like RSPCA and HSUS and newer, supposedly more 
progressive groups such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), for in effect 
perpetuating and propping up the exploitative system. 
 Not unexpectedly we can find no explicit response of the RSPCA to such damning criticisms 
of its role in both propping up and helping perpetuate „the system‟ (by „humanising‟ animal 
exploitation). Again, this silence speaks to the mobilisation strategy and ideology of this Establishment 
institution.  Those seeking sophisticated normative and ideological rationales of the politics of animal 
protectionism and the new welfarism have to turn to reformist „scholar-activists‟ such as Garner [12]. 
 
Conclusion 
Much of this paper‟s focus has been on the RSPCA as a key, if also „strange‟, exemplar of 
developments in the policing and control of animal abuse. The RSPCA is certainly a key player both in 
British society and also increasingly across the globe in the politics of animal protection and abuse 
control. Its „strangeness‟ may be due both to its charitable status and nineteenth- century Christian 
missionary roots and its continuing core role in policing animal abuse in a late-modern system of crime 
control. It is clearly an institution of social control worthy of interest in its own right. By exploring the 
historical continuities and discontinuities of this original „Victorian‟ invention over two centuries, we 
also hope to have shed light on the broader issues raised for the nascent criminology of animal abuse. 
We await future criminological work which may inform the future practice of animal abuse control and 
animal welfare protection and which might ambitiously help reconstitute the governmental savoir 
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